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LEGISLATIVE CHANGES IN THE LAW OF EQUITABLE
CONVERSION BY CONTRACT: I
SIDNEY P. SIAPSONt
T HE rights, powers, duties and liabilities arising out of a contract
for the sale of land as between the parties, and as between each
party and third persons in relation to the land, are frequently regarded
as derivable from the theory of an equitable conversion, in consequence
of which the purchaser is regarded in equity as owner of the land and
debtor for the purchase money and the vendor as a secured creditor
having a legal position not unlike that of a mortgagee' This doctrine
of equitable conversion is applicable only when there is a specifically
enforceable contract between the parties,2 and the changes in the rights,
duties, powers and liabilities of the parties which result from the mak-
ing of the contract are consequences of the equitable right to specific
performance.3 As between the parties to the contract, the doctrine is
invoked in allocating the benefits and burdens incident to property in
the land; as between the parties and third persons, it is invoked to deter-
mine the devolution upon death of the rights and liabilities of each party
with respect to the land, and to ascertain the powers of creditors of
each party to reach the land in payment of their claims. Whether the
tProfessor of Law, Harvard University. The main outlines of this article were presented
before a joint Round Table on Property and Status and on Legislation at the Thirty-
second Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, December 27, 1934.
1. See Lord Eldon's remarks in Seton v. Slade, 7 Ves. 265, 274 (Ch. 1S02), and Sugden's
discussion in ST. LEoxARDs, HLAmry Boor ox PRoPERTY Lxw (8th ed. 1869) 5-6. See also
the remarks of Jessel, M. R., in Lysaght v. Edwards, 2 Ch. D. 499, 507 (1876).
2. See p. 563, infra.
3. See the remarks of Lord Parker of Waddington in Howard v. Miler, (1915] A. C.
318, 326. A few decisions have sought to deduce the right to spcific performance of a
land contract from the theory of equitable conversion. See, e.g., Haughwout and Pom-
eroy v. Murphy, 22 N. J. Eq. 531, 547 (1871); Public Service Corp. of N. J. v. Haclhen-
sack Meadows Co., 72 N. J. Eq. 285, 287, 64 At. 976, 977 (1906). Historically, the theory
of equitable conversion probably developed rather more by analogy to the law of trusts than
on the basis of the doctrine of specific performance. See Bordwell, Equity and fhe Law
of Property (1934) 20 IowA L. REv. 1, 28-29.
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doctrine is an unnecessary fiction, as has been ably urged,4 or whether it
does in fact express an underlying principle in the decisions, it at least
furnishes a convenient label to attach to cases of several related groups
which, taken together, occupy an important corner in the law of real
property.
This particular comer of the law was for a long period unusually
free from legislative interference. The applicable principles were devel-
oped in a single court-the English Court of Chancery-beginning early
in the seventeenth century and reaching logical symmetry some two
hundred years later in the decisions of Lord Eldon" and in the writings
of Sugden.0 Later developments were regarded as being logical de-
ductions from established doctrines. To be sure, there have been
divergences of view on some matters, but these have been due, for the
most part, to differences in what has been deemed sound deductive rea-
soning from accepted premises rather than to any questioning of those
premises or conscious reliance upon considerations of mundane con-
venience or practical justice. This comer of property law thus has, like
that which includes the classic learning as to contingent remainders and
as to the application of the Rule against Perpetuities, an almost mathe-
matical atmosphere. Langdell's elaboration of the doctrine of equitable
conversion,7 which is the classic American exposition from a theoretical
standpoint, is as much a legal geometry as is Fearne's famous Essay.8
But even in this heaven of juristic conceptions,' the a-logical influence
of the legislator has been making itself felt in recent years; and it is no
longer possible to solve all problems involving equitable conversion by
deductive reasoning from the principles laid down by the English chan-
cellors and systematized by Sugden and Langdell.
An examination of the more important legislative changes, actual and
proposed, in the law of equitable conversion by contract'0 would, accord-
4. See Stone, Equitable Conversion by Contract (1913) 13 Co,. L. REv. 369. See also
Pound, Progress of the Law-Equity (1920) 33 HARv. L. REV. 813, 832: "... conver-
sion is a name given to results reached on other grounds, not a fact from which we may
reason for all purposes and with respect to the rights of all parties .... "
5. E.g., Paine v. Meller, 6 Ves. 349 (Ch. 1801); Seton v. Slade, 7 Ves. 265 (Ch. 1802);
Broome v. Monck, 10 Ves. 597 (Ch. 1805).
6. SUGDEN [Lord St. Leonards], VENDORS AND PURC.ASmiS (14th ed. 1862) 175 ct seq.
The first edition of this work appeared in 1805.
7. LANGDELL, A BRI=F SuRva or EQurry JURSDICION (2d ed. 1908) 260 et seq. A
considerable part of Langdell's discussion is concerned with equitable conversion by will.
Cf. note 10, infra.
8. FEARN, AN ESSAY ON THE LEA'ROiG or Co nomT REMAINDERS AND EXECUTORY
DEvisEs (1st ed. 1772). The last edition by Fearne himself is the fifth (1794).
9. Cf. VON JHERING, SCHERM UND ERNST IN DER JURI.SPRUDENZ (1884) 245 et seq.
10. The law as to equitable conversion by will, although it developed along with the
law of equitable conversion by contract and had some influence upon the development of
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ingly, appear to be in order, both for the purpose of ascertaining the
exact extent to which the field of that doctrine has been invaded by stat-
utes and for the purpose of appraising the significance of that invasion.
I
DEVOLUTION UPON DEATH OF VENDOR OR PURCHASER
The doctrine of equitable conversion by contract had its origin in
cases involving the devolution of rights and liabilities under land con-
tracts upon the death of one of the parties. Suppose that the vendor who
has contracted to sell Blackacre dies intestate before completion. Legal
title descends to the heir;" but is the heir entitled to enforce the contract
and receive the purchase money, or is the vendor's administrator entitled
to the purchase money as personal estate and the heir liable to be de-
prived of legal title to the profit of the next-of-kin? Or suppose that the
purchaser dies: His estate is liable for the unpaid purchase price, but who
is to pay it, as between heir and administrator, and who is to get the
land? The answer of classical equity to these questions was a dear-cut
and logical one. The vendor from the time of the contract had a claim
for money secured by a vendor's lien 2 on the land. On his death, his
administrator succeeded to the money claim; and, in equity, the security
followed the debt' and could be realized upon by the executor although
legal title had passed to the heir, a donee. 4 The purchaser, on the other
hand, from the time of the contract was regarded in equity as owner
of the land and as debtor for the purchase money. On his death, his
heir took this "land" by descent and his administrator became liable to
pay the purchase money out of the personal estate and thus exonerate
the land from the vendor's lien thereon."5 Thus, in the case of the yen-
the latter, need not be considered in this connection. Equitable conversion by Will is wholly
a part of the law of wills, descent and distribution; equitable conversion by contract has
a wide importance in the law of vendor and purchaser. The former depends upon the in-
tention of the testator; the latter does not depend upon intention, but rather upon rules
of law as to consequences of the right to specific performance of a land contract. See
Stone, Equitabe Conversion by Contract (1913) 13 COL. L. RE,. 369, 371. But d.
Inghram v. Chandler, 179 Iowa 304, 306, 161 N. W. 434, 435 (1917). The doctrines have
scarcely more than a verbal unity.
11. 1 Wa .sss, VEDOR A Pu cm~sER (3d ed. 1922) 503 et seq.
12. This term is used, following 3 Po-ERoy, EQurry JumspnuDraMcn (4th ed. 1918)
§ 1249, n. 1, to describe the security title of the vendor after the contract and before con-
veyance.
13. Cf. Graham v. McCampbell, 19 Tenn. 52 (1838); Walker & Trenholm v. Kee, 16
S. C. 76 (1881).
14. Bubb's Case, Freem. Ch. 38 (1678); Moore v. Burrows, 34 Barb. 173, 174 (N. Y.
1861); Potter v. Ellice, 48 N. Y. 321, 323 (1872); Flomerfelt v. Siglin, 155 Ala. 633, 640,
47 So. 106, 108 (1908).
15. Milner v. Ais, Mos. 123 (Ch. 1729); Young v. Young, 45 N. J. Eq. 27, 34, 16
AUt. 921, 925 (1889).
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dor's death, legal title is taken from the heir to enable the administrator
to recover the purchase price for the benefit of the next-of-kin; while,
in the case of the purchaser's death, the heir receives the land gratis
at the expense of the next-of-kin.
Under the common law canons of descent and rules as to distribution,
the application of these principles operated to affect substantially the
devolution of the rights and liabilities of intestate vendors and purchas-
ers in most cases; but with the abolition of primogeniture and the enact-
ment of modem statutes of descent and distribution," heirs and next-
of-kin are commonly the same persons taking in the same shares, 7 so
that the application of the doctrine of equitable conversion frequently
does not change devolution on intestacy. In this instance, legislation
in no way directed at modification of the theory of conversion has had
a large effect on the application of the theory and has rendered it of little
practical importance in a substantial class of cases. But these statutes
have had no such effect on testate devolution. Subject to some qualifi-
cations based on the actual or inferred intention of the testator, the same
principles as to conversion are applicable between devisee and executor
as between heir and administrator. On the purchaser's side, the devisee
of land contracted to be purchased prior to the making of the purchaser's
will gets the land, whether the devise is general18 or specific; 19 and, un-
der statutes which follow the Wills Act 20 with regard to devises of after-
acquired real estate, the same result is reached in the case of land con-
tracted to be purchased subsequent to the execution of the will.21 In
this latter situation, the theory of equitable conversion is applied to the
16. E.g., N. Y. DF zcmET ESTATE LAW, § 83, as amended by Laws 1929, c. 229, § 6.
The ADm-iSTRAT N OF ESTATES AcT, 15 GRO. V, c. 23, § 1 (1925), following 60 & 61
VicT., c. 65, § 1 (1897) goes further, providing that real estate shall devolve on the executor
or administrator in like manner as chattels real.
17. This is not always the case even under the modern statutes which have adopted
the general principle that real estate and personal property shall descend or be distributed
to the same persons upon intestacy. See e.g., WXs. STAT. (1933) § 318.01 (excep-
tion where the deceased leaves a widow and lawful issue).
18. Daire v. Beversham, Nels. 76, 77 (Ch. 1661); Greenhill v. Greenhill, 2 Vern,
679 (Ch. 1711); Potter v. Potter, 1 Ves. 438 (Ch. 1730); Dodge v. Gallatin, 130 N. Y. 117,
124, 29 N. E. 107, 108 (1891); Bailey v. Hoppin, 12 R. I. 560, 569 (1880).
19. Buck v. Buck, 11 Paige 170 (N. Y. 1884); Raymond v. Butts, 84 Ohio St.
51, 95 N. E. 387 (1911), 84 Ohio St. 491, 95 N. E. 1154 (1911); Ball v. Milliken, 31
R. 1. 36, 76 Atl. 789 (1910).
20. 7 Wmt. IV and 1 VIcr. c. 26 (1837). Under this Act and similar American statutes,
a general or residuary devise will pass after-acquired real estate if the testator so intends.
See 1 JAm.Ax, Wis (7th ed. 1930) 380 et seq.; 1 PAGE, WNr.Ls (2d ed. 1926) § 207, nn.
11, 13.
21. The rule as to general or residuary devises was otherwise prior to the Vills Act,




new situation resulting from the statutory change. On the vendor's side,
the executor is entitled to enforce the contract for the benefit of the per-
sonal estate, and a devisee who takes legal title-2 under a will executed
by the vendor prior to making the contract of sale holds this title in
equity simply as security for payment of the purchase money to the ex-
ecutor.' The making of a contract to sell land previously devised is
thus held to have the same effect in equity as the conveyance of such
land would have at law2 Where, however, the devise is subsequent
to the contract and is specific, it has been regarded by some courts as
being in effect a bequest of the purchase money due on the contract."'
This result is reached as a matter of construction without impugning
the principle of equitable conversion.20
Before passing to a consideration of the legislative changes, other than
those indirect ones already mentioned, in the law of equitable conversion
as applied in cases of devolution upon death, it is desirable to consider
certain further features of the law in the absence of statute. In the first
place, it is to be noted that the application of the conversion theory as-
sumes a specifically enforceable contract. If neither vendor nor pur-
chaser is entitled to specific performance, as, for example, where neither
party has signed a memorandum in writing sufficient to satisfy the Sta-
tute of Frauds, the devolution of rights and duties upon the death of
either party is the same as if no contract had ever been made. 7 If one
party is not entitled to specific performance but the other party is, as, for
example, in a case where partial performance with compensation could
be obtained by the purchaser only, devolution on the side of the party
who cannot enforce the contract is not affected,2 nor, according to the
authorities, is devolution on the side of the party who can compel specific
22. See Cotter v. Layer, 2 P. Wms. 623, 624 (Ch. 1731); Hall v. Bray, I N. J. L. 212
(1794).
23. Farrar v. Earl of Winterton, 5 Beav. 1 (Rolls Ct. 1842); Coles v. Feeney, 52
N. 3. Eq. 493 (1894); Donohoo v. Lea, 1 Swan 119 (Tenn. 1851); Church v. Hill, [1923]
Can. Sup. Ct. 642. Contra: Estate of Lefebvre, 100 Wis. 192, 75 N. W. 971 (1893).
24. See Kent, C., in Walton v. Walton, 7 Johns. Ch. 258, 268 (N. Y. 1823): ,.. . a
valid contract, for the sale of lands devised, is as much a revocation of the will in equity,
as a legal conveyance of them would be at law." See also pp. 568-569, infra.
25. Heirs of Wright v. finshall, 72 IMI. 584 (1874); Covey v. Dinsmoor, 226 I. 438,
80 N. E. 998 (1907); Rue v. Connell, 148 N. C. 302, 62 S. E. 306 (1905). See also Frick
v. Frick, 82 Md. 218, 33 Atl. 462 (1895) (residuary devise), noted in (1896) 9 Htnv. L.
REv. 489. Contra: Knollys v. Shepherd (H. L. 1824), reported in SucD=, LAw or Ptop-
ay (1849) 223; Guiry v. Condon, [1918] 1 Ir. R. 23. The decision in Knollys v. Shepherd
is severely criticized by Sugden. Loc. cit. supra. See also 2 JALUr, Wn.rs (7th ed. 1930)
713 et seq. And see In re Calow, [19281 1 Ch. 710, discussed in Note (1928) 6 CM. B.
REv. 792.
26. Cf. Frick v. Frick, 82 Md. 218, 227, 33 AUt. 462, 465 (1895).
27. Buckmaster v. Harrop, 7 Ves. 341 (Ch. 1802); Rose v. Cunnynghame, 11 Ves. 550
(Ch. 1805); Mills v. Harris, 104 N. C. 626, 10 S. E. 704 (1889).
28. In re Thomas, 34 Ch. D. 166 (1886).
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performance. 9 It is immaterial that the party who can enforce the con-
tract in fact elects, after the death of the other, to do so. On the other
hand, if there is a mutually specifically enforceable contract at the time
when a party dies, his rights and duties devolve in accordance with the
principles of equitable conversion even though the contract is not in fact
specifically enforced. Thus, where the vendor dies while the contract
is subsisting and specifically enforceable by and against him, his execu-
tor or administrator becomes entitled to the unpaid purchase money for
the benefit of the legatees or next-of-kin; and if the purchaser fails to
complete and the contract is not specifically enforced against him, the
vendor's executor or administrator can enforce payment of this money
out of the land in the hands of the vendor's devisee or heir.30 On the
same principle, an option which is exercised and so becomes a binding
contract before either party dies effects a conversions1 although the con-
tract is never in fact specifically enforced; but if the option is not exer-
cised until after the death of the optionor, there is in the United States,
no conversion 32 (although the English decisions regarding this point are,
erroneously, to the contrary);33 and if the option is not exercised until
29. Green v. Smith, 1 Atk. 572 (Ch. 1738); Broome v. Monck, 10 Ves. 597 (Ch. 1805);
Newton v. Newton, 11 R. I. 390, 394 (1876). See Garnett v. Acton, 28 Beav. 333, 337
(Ch. 1860); "[In order that there may be conversion on the purchaser's side] two things
must exist at the death of the testator; first, a valid contract; and secondly, one which
could be enforced against an unwilling purchaser."
30. Curre v. Bowyer, 5 Beav. 6, n. (b) (Ch. 1819); Keep v. Miller, 42 N. J. Eq. 100,
6 AtI. 495 (1886); Rose v. Jessup, 19 Pa. 280 (1852); Leiper's Appeal, 35 Pa. 420 (1860);
Robinson v. Pierce, 278 Pa. 372, 123 AtI. 324 (1924). Conversely, where the purchaser dies
under similar circumstances, his heir or devisee is entitled to the purchase money If the
contract is not carried out. See Whittaker v. Whittaker, 4 Bro, C. C. 31 (Ch. 1792);
Hudson v. Cook, 13 Eq. 417 (1872); Mathews v. Gadd, 5 So. Aust. L. R. 129 (1871). Cf.
LANGoELL, op. cit. supra note 7, at 311 et seq.; Stone, supra note 10, at 382 et seq. In
the case involving the heir or devisee and personal representative of the vendor, it is com-
monly said that the latter is entitled to the land. Cf. Curre v. Bowyer, 5 Beav. 6, n. (b)
<Ch. 1819): ". . . the estate ... [belongs] to the next of kin, and not the heir at law." But
the analysis in the text appears to be the accurate one. Thus, if the land had increased
greatly in value, the heir or devisee should be entitled to the excess over and above the
amount of the unpaid purchase money. There seem, however, to be no cases which are
decisive on this matter.
31. Heisel's Estate, 255 Pa. 612, 100 Atl. 462 (1917).
32. Inghram v. Chandler, 179 Iowa 304, 161 N. W. 434 (1917); Smith v. Loewen-
stein, 50 Ohio St. 346, 34 N. E. 159 (1893); Estate of Bisbee, 177 Wis. 77, 187 N. W. 653
(1922). See also Adams v. Peabody Coal Co., 230 Ill. 469, 82 N. E. 645 (1907); Rockland-
Rockport Lime Co. v. Leary, 203 N. Y. 469, 478, 97 N. E. 43, 45 (1911).
33. Lawes v. Bennett, 1 Cox Eq. Cas. 167 (Ch. 1785); Townley v. Bedwell, 14 Ves.
591 (Ch. 1808); Collingwood v. Row, 3 Jur. (N. S.) 785 (V. C. Kindersley 1857); Weed-
ing v. Weeding, 1 J. & H. 424 (Ch. 1861); In re Isaacs, [1894) 3 Ch. 506. See also In ro
Marlay, [1915) 2 Ch. 264. But the heir or devisee of the optionor is entitled to the rents and
profits until the option is exercised. See Townley v. Bedwell, 14 Ves. 591, 595 (Ch. 1808);
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after the death of the optionee, there is no conversion on the optionee's
side even on the English view34
One of the aspects of the law of equitable conversion as applied in
devolution cases which early attracted legislative attention was the rule
making it possible for an heir or devisee to demand that the purchase
price of land contracted to be purchased by his executor or testator be
paid out of the personal estate. Substantially the same situation pre-
sented itself in the case of mortgaged land where the mortgagor died
without having paid off the mortgage. In each of these situations, while
the equitable interest in the land (purchaser's "equitable title" or mort-
gagor's equity of redemption) passed to the heir or devisee, liability to
exonerate the land from the encumbrance thereon (vendor's lien or mort-
gage) was held to fall upon the executor or administrator, who was re-
quired to apply so much of the intestate or residuary personal estate as
might be necessary to that purpose.35 In consequence, the heir or devisee
was enriched and the residuary legatees or next-of-kin impoverished.
In re Marlay, [1915] 2 Ch. 264, 275, 279, 281. And where, after giving the option, the
optionor specifically devises the optioned property, the devisee is entitled to the purchas2
price if the option is exercised. Drant v. Vause, I Y. & C. C. C. SSG (Ch. 1342); Emuzz
v. Smith, 2 De G. & S. 722 (Ch. 1848); In re Pyle, [1895] 1 Ch. 724. In the recent cazz
of In re Carrington, [1932] 1 Ch. 1, discussed in (1932) 48 L. Q. Ra-. 458, (1933) 49 id.
173, (1931) 171 L. T. 538, (1932) 173 id. 396, (1932) 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1025, the Court
of Appeal held that the exercise, subsequent to the optionor's death, of an option on
personal property specifically bequeathed, adeemed the bequest, and that the proceeds- of
the property went to the optionor's residuary legatees. This decision seems as indefensible
on theory, even accepting the rule of Lawes v. Bennett, as it is unjust in practical effect.
The general rule of Lawes v. Bennett has been severely criticised by legal writers. See
Hart, The Inconsistencies of the Doctrine of Equitable Conversion (1903) 24 L. Q.
Ra. 403, 406 et seq.; L.AxGDELL, op. cit. supra note 7, at 269 et seq.; 2 JAn=rAu, WniLs
(7th ed. 1936) 712. But cf. Stone, supra note 10, at 376 et seq. Indeed, a leading English
authority has gone so far as to characterize Lawes v. Bennett as "a blot on the law re-
lating to constructive conversion?' Sweet, Options of Purchase Contained in Leases (1911)
55 SoL. J. 360, 361. There are dicta in accord with Lawes v. Bennett in a few American
jurisdictions. See McKay v. Carrington, 1 McL. 50, 54 (C. C. D. Ohio 1829); Keep v.
Miller, 42 N. J. Eq. 100, 107, 6 AUt. 495, 499 (1886); Chas. J. Smith Co. v. Anderson, 84
N. J. Eq. 681, 687, 95 At. 358, 361 (1915); Kerr v. Day, 14 Pa. St. 112, 115 (1850); Cor-
son v. Mulvany, 49 Pa. St. 88, 100 (1865). But the only American decision to this effect
has recently been explained and limited. See McGanna v. Hanan, 49 R. I. 349, 142 Ad. 6S9
(1928), explaining Newport Water Works v. Sisson, 18 R. I. 411, 28 AUt. 336 (1893).
34. In re Adams and The Kensington Vestry, 27 Ch. D. 394 (1834); Sutherland v. Par!:-
ins, 75 Ill. 338, 342 (1874); Gustin v. Union School-Dist., 94 Mich. 502, 54 N. W. 156
(1893); McCormick v. Stephany, 57 N. J. Eq. 257, 263, 41 AUt. 840, 842 (1893); Newton
v. Newton, 11 R. I. 390, 393 (1876); CLAsx, Equrrr (1919) § 111.
35. As to exoneration of mortgaged land, see 3 WoanmmRa, Am i uc L.-w oF A.1-rr-
riox (3d ed. 1923) § 494; Note (1927) 40 H.Av. L. REv. 630. The decisions are collected
in Notes (1920) 5 A. L. R. 483, (1922) 19 id. 1429, (1924) 29 id. 1246, (1931) 72 id. 709.
As to exoneration of land contracted to be purchased by the decedent, see note 15, supra;
Note (1929) 58 A. L. R. 436, 443 et seq.
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From a strict logical standpoint, this result is reasonable enough. Once
it is admitted that equitable interests in land devolve as land, it is clear
that purchaser's interests and equities of redemption pass to the heir
or devisee. But the duty to pay the debts of the decedent falls upon the
executor or administrator to the extent of assets received. Hence he
must pay the purchase money or mortgage debt out of the fund which
he has to pay debts (viz., the personal estate), and, since it was the dece-
dent, not the land encumbered as security, that was primarily liable for
debts, there is no reason in strict logic for allowing the personal repre-
sentative recourse against the exonerated land, unless, in the case of death
testate, an intention on the part of the testator to allow such recourse
is expressed in or may be inferred from the will."0 This rule, moreover,
tended to protect the integrity of the landed property of decedents, and
was entirely consistent with the general spirit of the old English land
law, which "favours the heir."3 7 But, however logical and however well
suited to a society of landed gentry desirous of keeping their land hold-
ings intact from generation to generation, the rule came to be looked
at askance with the advent of a time when primogeniture was being abol-
ished and land was coming to be regarded as being merely one species
of property to be dealt with commercially and not as something almost
sacrosanct8 It came to be believed, and with sound reason, that most
testators, if their attention has been directed to the point, would have
provided expressly that their purchasers' interests under land contracts
and their equities of redemption should not be exonerated at the expense
of their personal estate, and that most persons dying intestate would not
have desired such exoneration. Moreover, the rule frequently operated
in such a way as to cause great hardship and practical injustice.8 Re-
sponsive to this belief, legislation providing that there should be no right
of exoneration of mortgaged land upon intestacy, and none where the
mortgagor died testate unless expressly provided for in his will, was
enacted in England in 1854;1 0 and in 1877 this rule was extended to the
exoneration of land "from any other equitable charge, including any lien
for unpaid purchase money."'41 The effect of these statutes, commonly
referred to as Locke King's Acts, is to leave the executor or administra-
tor liable for the purchase money or mortgage debt due from the dece-
36. Intention to allow such recourse is inferred to prevent exoneration out of specific
legacies and, in most jurisdictions, out of general legacies. But cf. Brown v. Baron, 162
Mass. 56, 37 N. E. 772 (1894).
37. Shadwell, V. C., in Lumsden v. Fraser, 12 Sim. 263 (Ch. 1841).
38. Cf. RADcrcz, REA. PROPERTY LAW (1933) 210.
39. See LOCxE KING, IwjusTicE or Tn LAW OF SUCCESSION TO ThE REAr PROPERtTY Or
INTESTATES (1855) 134 et seq.
40. 17 & 18 Vicr. c. 113 (1854), amended by 30 & 31 Vicr. c. 69 (1867).
41. 40 & 41 VicT. c. 34 (1877).
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dent, but to make that indebtedness ultimately payable out of the pur-
chased or mortgaged land, if sufficient for the purpose, rather than out
of the intestate or residuary personal estate. The heir or devisee thus
takes subject to the vendor's lien or the mortgage, and the personal
estate going to the next-of-kin or residuary legatees is unaffected unless
the land is insufficient to pay the indebtedness due to the vendor or
mortgagee, or unless, in the case of death testate, the testator expressly
provides for exoneration.4
There has been no legislation abrogating the right of exoneration in
most of the United States, and, where such legislation exists, it is much
less broad than in England. In New York, the right to exoneration of
mortgaged property unless provided for in the mortgagor's will has been
abrogated by an express statute, 3 but the courts have refused to extend
the statute to cases where an heir or devisee seeks exoneration from a
vendor's lien.44 There is similar legislation in New Jersey,45 and in
Missouri the same result has been reached as to exoneration from sub-
sequent mortgages under a statute" providing in terms that the mort-
gaging of property devised or bequeathed shall not revoke the devise or
bequest, which shall "pass and take effect subject to such charge or in-
cumbrance.14 1 In Louisiana, where the matter has been worked out on
a civil law basis, no right of exoneration from mortgages exists;43 and
in Massachusetts there is no such right in the case of land specifically
devised unless provided for in the mortgagor's will. And there is a
42. An intention to provide for exoneration is not to be inferred from " ... a charge
or direction for the payment of debts upon or out of residuary real and per-onal Etat...."
40 & 41 Vice. c. 34, § 1.
43. N. Y. REAL PRO TrY LAw (1909) § 250.
44. Lamport v. Beeman, 34 Barb. 239 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1861); Wright v. Holbrook, 32
N. Y. 587, 590 (1865) ; Bach v. Tuch, 126 N. Y. 53, 59, 26 N. E. 1019, 1021 (1891).
45. 1 N. J. Comx. STA.T. (Supp. 1924) 1971, § 134-46-a; Swetland v. Swetland,
10D N. J. Eq. 196, 206, 134 AUt. 822, 827 (1926); In re Staiger, 104 N. J. Eq. 149, 144 Atl.
619 (1929). An earlier statute providing that no personal action to recover a mortgage debt
should be brought, except for the deficiency after foreclosure, had been held, after some
vacillation, not to abrogate the right of exoneration. See 3 N. J. Cooxp. ST,T. (1911) 3421,
§ 48; Hill v. Hill, 93 N. J. Eq. 567, 117 Ati. 256 (1922), affd 95 N. J. Eq. 233, 122 AtL 318
(1923), overruling Smith v. Wilson, 79 N. J. Eq. 310, 81 At. 851 (1911), and Atkinzon v.
Atkinson, 84 N. 3. Eq. 104, 92 At. 795 (1914).
46. 1 Mo. STAT. A-NN. (1932) 317, § 523.
47. Hannibal Trust Co. v. Elzea, 315 Mo. 485, 286 S. W. 371 (1926); Gates v.
Rice, 320 Mo. 580, 8 S. W. (2d) 614 (1928); Peck v. Fillingham, 199 Mo. App. 277, 202
S. W. 465 (1918). The soundness of this interpretation of the statute has been doubted.
See 3 WoEmeER, op. cit. supra note 35, at 1733; Note (1927) 40 HLnv. L. REv. 630, 634
(pointing out that the Missouri decisions abrogate the common law rule of exoneration" ...
only as to property mortgaged subsequent to the will, which seems curiously partial relief").
48. LA. Rnv. CIv. CODE (Merrick, 1925) Arts. 1440-1443; Succession of Rabasa, 47
La. Ann. 1126, 17 So. 597 (1895).
49. MAss. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 191, § 23.
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suggestion that the Oregon statute as to the redemption or sale of the
mortgaged property of decedents 0 has abrogated the right of exoneration
from mortgages in that state. 1 No state, however, appears to have ex-
pressly provided by statute for the abrogation of the right of exonera-
tion of land contracted to be purchased.
The contrast between the present English and American law as to ex-
oneration is striking. In England, the legislature has effectively dealt
with the entire problem and has brought about a situation where the law
appears to be consistent with modem social and economic needs. In this
country, most state legislatures have not dealt with the problem at all.
Where the problem has been dealt with, it has been by means of piece-
meal legislation resulting in only a partial solution. It would seem that
the preparation by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws or other appropriate body 2 of a model act patterned on
the English legislation would serve a very useful purpose in making
readily available a properly drafted form of statute and in stimulating
the various state legislatures to activity in dealing with the exoneration
problem. 3
Another aspect of the law of equitable conversion in devolution cases
upon which legislative attention has been focused is the rule as to re-
vocation of devises by subsequent land contracts. This rule is the equit-
able analogy to the rule at law as to revocation of devises by subse-
quent conveyances and is also closely related to doctrines as to ademption
of specific legacies.a Where land devised or personal property be-
queathed is transferred or destroyed by the testator and so does not
form part of his estate at his death, the devise or bequest of such prop-
erty is necessarily defeated. 4 There is some authority, moreover, that
a conveyance of the devised land defeats a specific devise although the
land is reacquired by the testator before his death,5 and that an inopera-
50. ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) §§ 11-625, 11-626.
51. See Howe v. Kern, 63 Ore. 487, 496, 125 Pac. 834 (1912); 3 WoaNXR, op. cit.
supra note 35, at 1733, 1734.
52. Such as, e.g., the American Law Institute or the newly-formed Section on Real
Property Law of the American Bar Association.
53. Cf. Fraser, The Unfortunate Status of Certain Factors of Real Property Law and
Suggested Remedies (1934) 20 A. B. A. J. 684.
53'. "Ademption", in the technical sense in which the word is used herein, means the
revocation of testamentary gifts of personal property through the extinction of the subject-
matter of the gifts or in some similar manner.-Ev.
54. As to the revocation of devises by conveyance of the devised land, see 1 Wonrmm,
op. cit. supra note 35, at § 53. As to the ademption of legacies, see 3 id. §§ 446-450,
55. Phillippe v. Clevenger, 239 Ill. 117, 87 N. E. 858 (1909). Contra: Estate of Hopper,
66 Cal. 80, 4 Pac. 984 (1884); Woolery v. Woolery, 48 Ind. 523 (1874) (with dissent);
Morey v. Sohier, 63 N. H. 507, 3 Atl. 636 (1885); Gregg v. McMillan, 54 S. C. 378, 32
S. E. 447 (1898). See 1 PAcE, Wmrs (2d ed. 1926) § 467.
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tive conveyance is similarly effective." The reasoning of the decisions so
holding is that the testator has shown an intention to revoke the devise.
On the other hand, the present trend of authority is toward holding that
an involuntary conversion of property will effect a revocation of a de-
vise or the ademption of a bequest, although there is no basis for any
argument that the testator so intendedY When, by an application of
the principles involved in the doctrine of equitable conversion, a contract
to sell devised land is given the effect in equity of a conveyance at law,
similar problems arise, and, in general, similar results have been reached.
Where there was at the time of the vendor's death a specifically enforce-
able contract to sell devised land, the application of the doctrine of
conversion logically results in holding that the devise is revoked un-
less it can be construed as a bequest of the purchase money, 3 even though
the contract is rescinded or for some other reason is never in fact per-
formed.60 The decisions holding that the same result follows where the
contract was rescinded or abandoned during the testator's lifetime0 ' are
more doubtful, and can be supported only on the theory that the testa-
tor has manifested an intention to revoke the devise to which equity will
give effect. And it seems difficult to sustain on any ground the sugges-
tion that the making of an unenforceable contract to sell devised land
revokes the devise. -
The problem of ademption by equitable conversion of personal
property has not often been raised;0 a recent decision that such
ademption is effected by the exercise, subsequent to the optionor's death,
of an option to purchase personal property specifically bequeathed'
seems open to grave criticism not only as misapplying the principle of
conversion but also as extending it beyond its proper bounds. c3
56. Cf. 1 PAGE, W= (2d ed. 1926) § 458.
57. See Note (1932) 45 H11Av. L. REv. 710; Ametrano v. Downs, 170 N. Y. 3$3, 392, 63
N. E. 340, 341 (1902). Cf. Smith, Ademption, by Extinction (1931) 6 Wis. L. Rvi. 229;
(1932) 17 IowA L. Rxv. 552.
5S. See cases cited in note 23, supra.
59. As where there is a specific devise subsequent to the contract to sell. See note 25,
supra.
60. Bennett v. Earl of Tankerville, 19 Ves. 170 (Ch. 1811); Tebbott v. Voules, 6 Sir.
40 (Ch. 1833).
61. Andrew v. Andrew, 8 De G. M. & G. 336 (Ch. 1856); Walton v. Walton, 7 Johns. Ch.
258 (N. Y. 1823).
62. See Gensinore's Estate, 246 Pa. 216, 219, 92 AtI. 134, 135 (1914). Contra: Re Fuller's
Estate, 71 Vt. 73, 42 AUt. 981 (1S98); see Crowe v. Menton, L. R. 28 Ir. 519, 524 (IS91);
2 JA aa r, Wzs (7th ed. 1930) 712.
63. Only a specifically enforceable contract will be treated in equity like a conveyance
at law; contracts to sell personal property are not ordinarily specifically enforceable. More-
over, there is no substantial authority for applying the theory of equitable conversion to
cases other than those involving land. But cf. Virginia Shipbuilding Corp. v. United States,
22 F. (2d) 38, 49 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927), cert. denied, 276 U. S. 625 (1923).
64. In re Carrington, [1932] 1 Ch. 1. 65. See notes 33 and 63, supra.
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There can be little doubt that application of the rules as to revoca-
tion of devises by contracts to sell made by the testator which have been
worked out in equity on analogy to the rules at law as to the effect of
conveyances and attempted conveyances of devised land frequently
brings about results quite different from those which the vendor-testator
would have desired. This possibility has not, for the most part, been
regarded as material by the courts which have invoked the doctrine of
equitable conversion in such cases. They have proceeded rather on the
basis of strict deductive logic than on the basis of practical convenience.
It is not at all surprising, therefore, that legislative intervention has
been deemed necessary in a considerable number of jurisdictions. Thus,
in New York, a contract to sell "any property devised or bequeathed in
any will previously made, shall not be deemed a revocation of such pre-
vious devise or bequest, either at law or in equity; but such property
shall pass by the devise or bequest, subject to the same remedies . ..,
for a specific performance or otherwise, against the devisees or legatees,
as might have been had against the heirs of the testator, or his next of
kin, if the same had descended to them." 6 Similar legislation is in force
in at least nine other states. 67  That such statutes are designed com-
pletely to do away with the doctrine that gifts by will are revoked or
adeemed by contracts to sell the subject-matter of the gift seems tolerably
plain; and yet there is authority to the effect that, where the contract
of sale is enforced by the purchaser after the testator's death, the pur-
chase money goes to the next-of-kin or residuary legatees and not to the
devisee of the land contracted to be sold. 8 This view as to the effect
of this legislation seems clearly erroneous. Not only does it prevent the
statute from attaining its obvious purpose, but it makes the devolution
of the vendor's property depend upon whether or not the contract of sale
is in fact carried out after his death. There is surely no justification for
introducing so fortuitous a factor in determining how property shall
devolve. Although it is hardly to be supposed that this construction will
be adopted in other states,0 9 a wise draftsman of such legislation might
well follow the example of the Alabama statute in providing expressly
66. N. Y. DEc ENT ESTATE LAW (1916) § 37.
67. See 1 WOERNER, op. cit. supra note 35, at 148. It is also provided by statute in these
states and in New York that the mortgaging of land by a testator shall not revoke a devise
thereof, but the land shall pass to the devisee subject to the mortgage. Id. at 148, n. 12,
Cf. notes 46 and 47, supra. As to the effect of a mortgage on a devise in the absence
of statute, see Note (1930) 65 A. L. R. 632.
68. Ostrander v. Davis, 191 Fed. 156 (C. C. A. 8th, 1911), construing what is now S. D.
Comp. LAWS (1929) § 631.
69. See Matter of Prentice, 134 Misc. 343, 236 N. Y. Supp. 239 (Surr. Ct. 1929), In
which the New York statute, which is substantially similar to the South Dakota statute
involved in Ostrander v. Davis, supra note 68, was applied according to its terms.
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that "the purchase money, when recovered by the executor of the testa-
tor, must be paid to the devisee.170  If this is done, the possibility that
the courts may emasculate the statute seems slight. The drafting of a
model statute abolishing the rule of revocation of devises by contracts
to sell might properly, it would seem, be taken up by the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws or other appropriate
body."
II
RIGHTS OF SURVIVING SPOUSE OF VENDOR OR PURCHASER
Closely related to the problem of the devolution of the interests of
the parties to a land contract as between heirs or devisees and next-of-
kin or legatees is that of the rights of the surviving spouses of the parties.
At common law, the widow of a deceased vendor gets dower in the
land contracted to be sold, and the surviving husband of a vendor is
entitled to curtesy if issue has been born alive. - In equity, however, the
widow or surviving husband of a vendor who had contracted to sell land
before marriage, like the surviving spouse of a trustee,73 holds his or
her legal estate in trust for the person equitably entitled to the land;7
and it is immaterial that he or she had no notice of the contract at the
time of his or her marriage with the vendor.ll The rule is otherwise as
to contracts made during coverture unless the surviving spouse (having
capacity to do so) joins in the contract, 70 or unless the legislature has
made it possible for one spouse to deprive the other of his or her interest
70. ALA. CODE ANN. (Aflchie, 1928) § 10588; see Phillips v. Phllift s 213 Ala. 27, 28,
104 So. 234, 236 (1925).
71. The same statute might well abrogate the rule as to revocation by mortgage aL-o,
Cf. note 67, supra. And it should give a quietus to any notion of the possibility of equitable
ademption. Cf. notes 63 and 64, supra.
72. Diamond's Adam. v. Billingslee, 2 Har. & Gil. 264 (Md. 1828) (widow).
73. E.g., Noel v. Jevon, Freem. Ch. 43 (1678) (widow); Bennet v. Davis, 2 P. Wins.
316 (Rolls Ct. 1725) (surviving husband).
74. Dooley v. Merrill, 216 Mass. 500, 104 N. E. 345 (1913) (widow); Brown v.
Security Say. & Trust Co., 140 Ore. 615, 618, 14 P. (2d) 1107, 1103 (1932) (came); 4
K=r, Co AsImms (12th ed. 1873) *50. The dower cases are collected in Note (1929)
63 A. L. R. 136. The vendor's widow was held not to be entitled to dower in the unpaid
purchase money in Detroit Trust Co. v. Baker, 230 Mich. 551, 203 N. W. 154M, 204 N. W.
773 (1925) (with dissent), overruling In re Estate of Pulling, 97 Alich. 375, 56 N. W.
765 (1893), and in Brown v. Security Say. & Trust Co., supra, at 620, 14 P. (2d) at 1103.
75. J. J. Newberry Co. v. Shannon, 268 Mfass. 116, 167 N. E. 292 (1929). Contra:
Braxton v. Lee's Heirs, 4 Hen. & Mun. 376 (Va. 1809).
76. See the discussion of the effect of the joinder of the wife of a vendor in an executory
contract for the sale of land in Brown v. Security Say. & Trust Co., 140 Ore. 615, 618-19,
14 P. (2d) 1107, 1108 (1932).
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in property acquired during coverture without the other's consent.17 In
some jurisdictions, the purely technical right of the surviving spouse
to dower or curtesy at law in land contracted to be sold prior to cover-
ture has been done away with by statute.78 Moreover, there is an in-
creasing tendency toward the abolition of dower and curtesy and the
substitution therefor of some form of statutory heirship as between hus-
band and wife.79 Where such legislation has been enacted, the problem
of the rights of the surviving spouse of the vendor becomes simply a
question of the rights of a peculiar statutory heir.
The widow or surviving husband of a purchaser, cestui que trust,
mortgagor, or other owner of an equitable interest in land of course does
not get dower or curtesy at law. However, it was early held that the
surviving husband of a cestui que trust 0 or mortgagor 81 was entitled
to curtesy in equity. Nevertheless, for obscure reasons,82 the widow of
a cestui que trust83 or mortgagor84 was denied dower in equity; and
the same rule has been applied to the widow of a purchaser under a land
contract even though her husband was beneficially entitled to the land
at the time of his death."5 It has been held, on analogy to the
dower cases, that the surviving husband of a purchaser is not entitled
to curtesy in equity;88 but this seems patently inconsistent with the es-
tablished rule that the surviving husband of a cestui que trust or mort-
gagor is so entitled, 7 and the generalization may be ventured that, in
the absence of statute, the widow of the owner of an equitable interest
in land is not entitled to dower, while the surviving husband does get
curtesy.
77. Statutes abolishing inchoate dower or curtesy [cf. notes 89, 98, 100, infra] should have
this effect, since if the vendor can convey free of any claim of his or her spouse, he or she
should be be able to contract to do so.
78. E.g., Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 2135. 79. See note 99, infra.
g0. Watts v. Ball, 1 P. Wins. 108 (Ch. 1708).
81. Casborne v. Inglis, 1 Atk. 603, sub nom. Casborne v. Inglis, 2 J. & W. 194 (Ci. 1738).
82. See Attorney General v. Scott, Cas. Talb. 138, 139 (Ch. 1735); D'Arcy v. Blake, 2
Sch. & Lef. 387 (Ir. Ch. 1805); 3 HOLDSwoRTH, HSTORY OF ENLIasu LAW (3d ed. 1923)
197; RAvcL=, RE.AL PROPERTY LAW (1933) 29. Holdsworth says, loc. cit. supra: "Proba-
bly the reasons which induced the chancellors to take this course were firstly, analogy to the
rule applied to uses before the Statue of Uses, and secondly the fact that the wife's rights
inconveniently restricted freedom of alienation." Perhaps the fact that curtesy might carry
voting rights may have had something to do with the matter.
83. Bottomley v. Lord Fairfax, Prec. Ch. 336 (1712); Chaplin v. Chaplin, 3 P. Wms. 229
(Ch. 1733).
84. Dixon v. Saville, 1 Bro. C. C. 326 (Ch. 1783); Dawson v. Bank of Whitchaven, 6
Ch. D. 218 (1877).
85. Bowen v. Collins, 15 Ga. 100 (1854); Claiborne v. Henderson, 13 Va. 322 (1809);
cf. Pritts v. Richey, 29 Pa. 71, 75 (1857).
86. Grandjean v. Beyl, 78 Neb. 349, 110 N. W. 1108 (1907).
87. Cf. Note (1909) 128 Am. St. Rep. 474, 483 et seq.
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The denial of dower in equitable estates while curtesy therein was al-
lowed became a subject of legislative consideration at an early date.
Some jurisdictions, logically enough, enacted statutes providing for dower
in equitable interests analogous in all respects to dower at law 8 But
there were obvious disadvantages involved in so doing. Dower at law,
attaching as it does to any land of which the husband is seized at any
time during coverture, interferes seriously with the marketability of
titles; and many legislatures were unwilling to extend this clog on free
alienability to equitable interests. The difficulty caused by curtesy was
much less serious, partly because considerably less land was held and
sold by married women than by married men and partly because, in
many states, curtesy at law had been limited to property of which the
wife was seized at her death and had not disposed of by her will. Hence
the more usual form of American statute, while providing for dower in
equitable interests, limits the widow's rights to such as her husband
owned at his death. An early North Carolina statute 0 may be taken as
fairly typical: "... . when a man shall die siezed of an equity of redemp-
tion or other equitable or trust estate in fee, his wife shall be entitled
to Dower therein, subject to valid encumbrances thereon, in the same
manner as she is now entitled to be endowed of a legal estate of inheri-
tance." This statute has been held to give dower in equity to the widow
of a purchaser under a land contract although the purchase price has
not been paid.1 Such is the rule in a considerable number of statesP2
88. As in Iowa. IOWA CODE (1931) § 11990; Hutchinson v. 0lberding, 136 Iowa 346, 343,
112 N. W. 647, 648 (1907). And in Virginia. VA. CODE Az,.. (1930) § 5158; James v.
Upton, 96 Va. 296, 31 S. E. 255 (1898). So also, now, in North Carolina. See note So,
infra. The Iowa statute gives statutory dower to the extent of a fee simple interest in one-
third in value of the decedent's real estate to the surviving husband as well as to the widow.
89. This, for example, was the situation in New York prior to the recent extensive
amendment of the Decedent Estate Law of that state by N. Y. Laws 1929, c. 229. Curtesy
was expressly left untouched by DECEDmnT EsrATE LAw § 80(4), and continued to exigt; but
Domsc Ra Anioxs LAW § 50, providing that real property owned by a married woman
should "continue to be her sole and separate property as if she were unmarried", taken in
connection with DECFDENT EsTATE LAW § 10 and RrAL PRoPERTY MXw § 11, made it pt%:Jb ,e
for a married woman to dispose of her land by conveyance inter vivos or by will free of any
claim of her husband. The result was in effect to abolish curtesy initiate and to limit
curtesy consummate to land not disposed of by the wife during her lifetime or by will.
See Hatfield v. Sneden, 54 N. Y. 280, 287 (1873); Albany County Say. Bank v. McCarty,
149 N. Y. 71, 85, 43 N. E. 427, 432 (1896); Matter of Starbuck, 137 App. Div. 866, 122
N. Y. Supp. 584 (1910), aff'd on opinion below, 201 N. Y. 531, 94 N. E. 1093 (1911).
It is not wholly dear whether curtesy still exists in New York in this attenuated form.
See N. Y. Laws 1929, c. 229, § 6.
go. N. C. Acts 1828-1831, c. 14. But North Carolina has since adopted the policy of
giving dower in equitable estates of which the husband "was seized in fee at any time
during the coverture". See N. C. CODE A . (Michie, 1931) § 4100.
91. Thompson v. Thompson, 46 N. C. 430 (1894).
92. See the cases collected in Note (1930) 66 A. L. R. 65, 70.
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Moreover, it has been held that, under such circumstances, the widow is
entitled to exoneration out of the equitable estate which has descended
to her husband's heirs; 93 but the weight of authority is to the contrary.P4
In any event, the widow, like an heir or devisee, may claim exoneration
out of her husband's personal estate 5 Nowhere has this right been
abrogated by legislation. 6 In a few states, however, the widow of the
purchaser has dower only if the entire purchase price has been paid prior
to her husband's death 7
The legislation just discussed has been concerned with extending to
equitable interests, at least to some degree, the dower rights of the widow
which exist at law. Such legislation operates to make equitable con-
version effective in favor of the purchaser's widow just as it is effective
without statute in favor of the purchaser's surviving husband and against
the vendor's surviving spouse. Other legislation which is important in
determining the rights of the surviving spouse of the purchaser has an
entirely different effect. In almost every jurisdiction, there has been
extensive statutory modification of the common law rules as the prop-
erty rights of the widow or surviving husband generally. Curtesy has
been abolished or greatly limited in many states, and so has dower.9 8
In a considerable number of jurisdictions, husband and wife are made
statutory heirs of one another and take by descent rather than by marital
right, although often the heirship is made immune from testamentary
interference.9 9 There has been a distinct tendency to provide for free
alienability by each spouse of his or her property without regard for any
93. I.e., if the personal estate of the deceased purchaser is not sufficient to provide
all the unpaid purchase money, the overplus will be raised, if possible, by selling the equita-
ble interests of the heirs; and only thereafter will the equitable dower of the widow be pro-
ceeded against for any deficiency. Caroon v. Cooper, 63 N. C. 386 (1869); cf. Bowen v.
Lingle, 119 Ind. 560, 563, 20 N. E. 534, 535 (1889).
94. Greenbaum v. Austrian, 70 Ill. 591, 594 (1873); Harrison v. Griffith, 67 Ky. 146,
148 (1868); Church v. Church, 3 Sandf. Ch. 434, 436 (N. Y. 1846); Thompson v. Cochran,
26 Tenn. 72 (1846).
95. Williams v. Kinney, 43 Hun 1, 8 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1887), aff'd without opinion,
118 N. Y. 679, 23 N. E. 1147 (1890); Klutts v. Klutts, 58 N. C. 80 (1859); Love v.
McClure, 99 N. C. 290, 294, 6 S. El. 247, 249 (1888). But cf. Poteet v. International
Harvester Co., 153 Va. 304 (1929), 149 S. E. 512 (exoneration of dower from mortgage denied
in accordance with what is stated to be the prevailing American rule); (1929) 16 VA. L.
REv. 211.
96. It has been held that a statute abrogating the right of exoneration of mortgaged
land theretofore existing in favor of heirs and devisees does not take away the widow's
right of exoneration in respect of her dower. See Gerhardt v. Sullivan, 107 N. J. Eq. 374,
376, 152 Atl. 663, 664 (1930).
97. See the cases collected in Note (1930) 66 A. L. R. 65, 67.
98. See 1 WoERNER, op. cit. supra note 35, at § 106 (dower), § 121 (curtesy); Note
(1925) 25 CoL. L. REV. 938 (dower).
99. See Sayre, Husband and Wife as Statutory Heirs (1929) 42 HARv. L. REV. 330; 1
WOEaRN, op. cit. supra note 35, at §§ 66-67.
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claim of the other. In so far as such changes have been made in the
interests of the spouses in each other's property at law, they are reflected
in the rules applicable to equitable interests either by the express terms
of the statutes involved or because rights in equitable interest are held to
have incidents similar to corresponding rights in legal estates. The
trend is thus toward the same rules at law and in equity as to the prop-
erty rights of the spouses and toward a limitation of those rights in the
interest of free alienability of land. An excellent illustration of this trend
is to be found in the English legislation. The Dower Act, 1833,111 gave
dower in equitable as well as in legal estates, but limited it in both cases
to land to which the husband was beneficially entitled at his death and
had not disposed of by his will. The Administration of Estates Act,
1925,101 went still further. It abolished dower and curtesy in intestate
realty,102 except in entailed interests,0 3 and substituted therefor a system
of non-forced statutory heirship as between husband and wife under
which both are treated exactly alike.'0 4 In so far as such legislation is
applicable, there are no longer special problems of the law of equitable
conversion in the case of the surviving spouse of the purchaser, any more
than there are in the case of the surviving spouse of the vendor.
In
RIGHTS OF CREDITORS OF VENDOR OR PURCHASER
The rights of creditors of the vendor or purchaser to reach the in-
terest of their debtor in the land contracted to be sold or purchased de-
pend in large part on the theory of equitable conversion. Since, on that
theory, the purchaser is regarded as owner of the land and debtor for
the purchase money and the vendor as holding legal title as security
for payment by the purchaser, it logically follows that creditors .of the
purchaser should be able to reach the land subject to the vendor's lien
thereon, while creditors of the vendor should be able to reach the land
only to the extent of the vendor's security interest. This is the under-
lying conception on the basis of which the law in this field has developed;
but that development has been shaped to a very considerable extent by
100. 3 & 4 WI.L. IV, c. 195 (1833). See 3 Homnswonrm, op. cit. supra note 82, at 197.
101. 15 GEo. V, c. 23 (1925).
102. Id. at § 45. And it repealed the Dower Act, 1833. Id. 2d Sch, pt. IM Cf. id. § 51
(2). As to whether dower in devised realty still exists in England, see Farrer, Docer and the
New Legislation (1930) 74 Sor. J. 50; the comments on this article by Eastwood, id. at
104, and Knox, id. at 186; Farrer, Dower and the New Legislation-A Reply, id. at 361;
and the comment thereon, id. at 563. See also id. at 576.
103. Under the English property legislation of 1925, these are "equitable" intere-sts.
See RADcrurx RnAL PRoPERTY LAW (1933) 220 et seq.; Schnebly, "Legal" and "Equitable"
Interests in Land under the English Legislation of 1925 (1926) 40 HuiRv. L. Rnv. 243.
104. 15 GEo. V, c. 23, § 46(1)(i) (1925).
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the existence of statutes as to executions and judgment liens, so that the
practical applications of the underlying principle are intelligible only
upon a somewhat detailed examination of this legislation.
If the creditors of the purchaser are to reach his interest under a land
contract, not only must he be regarded in equity as having an interest in
the land but there must be some procedure whereby such an interest may
be reached and applied to the payment of the owner's debts. There is no
difficulty, on the theory of equitable conversion, in regarding the pur-
chaser as equitable owner of the land; but there are difficulties in reach.
ing his interest. Under the early common law, lands were not subject
to execution on private judgments. 105 The Statute of Westminster I1,10
however, partially subjected legal interests in real estate to a form of
execution under the writ of elegit, and, as a result of legislation since that
time, legal estates in land may be reached by judgment creditors,
either by execution or by extent under an elegit.'0 7 But neither ordinary
execution nor extent was applicable to equitable interests in land,108 so
that, in the absence of statutory aid, a creditor's only recourse in reach-
ing such interests was and still is by bill in equity for equitable execu-
tion.1°9 However, the speedier, cheaper and more effective remedy of
execution has very generally been made available, at least to some extent,
to the creditors of a purchaser under a land contract. The applicable
statutes may be classified into three main groups: (1) What is still the
most usual type of American statute 10 is modelled on Section 10 of the
English Statute of Frauds,"" and operates, "after the analogy of the
Statute of Uses, to vest the legal title in the purchaser under the execu-
tion whenever the execution debtor like a cestui que use . .. [has] the
entire unencumbered beneficial interest.""' Such statutes have usually
been construed to allow the purchaser's interest under a land contract to
be sold on execution if the entire purchase price has been paid but not
otherwise." 3 (2) In a few states, the interest of the purchaser under a
land contract is subjected to sale on execution under specified conditions
105. See 2 FxRErA.", EXFCUTiONS (3d ed. 1900) 881 et seq.
106. 13 EDw. I, St. 1, c. 18 (1285). See 3 HOLDSWORT.U, op. cit. sgpra note 82, at 131,
107. See 2 FR=xMAIN, ExEcuToIs (3d ed. 1900) 882.
108. Nor could equitable interests in personal property be levied upon and sold under
a fleri facias. See 1 FRExsi, ExCUToIs (3d ed. 1900) § 116.
109. As to equitable execution, see 4 PoimoY, op. cit. supra note 12, at § 1415, 5 Id. §
2302.
110. See 2 FREEmsi, EXECUTIONS (3d ed. 1900) §§ 187-188; (1931) 15 Mt=. L. Ray.
841, 842.
111. 29 CAR. II c. 3, § 10 (1677).
112. 1 A ES, CAsES 3N EQUITY JuRisICToN (1904) 214, n. 2.




by statutes dealing expressly with such interests. n 4  (3) An increasing
number of states have statutes providing that execution may be levied on
any interest in real estate, legal or equitable. 1" These are construed as
allowing execution upon the interest of a purchaser under a land contract
regardless of whether or not the purchase price has been paid in whole or
in part."1 6 The same construction has, moreover, been given to statutes
much less specific in their terms, providing, for example, that all proper-
ty, real and personal, of a judgment debtor may be sold on execution and
that real estate shall include "lands, tenements and hereditaments
and all rights thereto and interests therein,"" 7 or that lands and tene-
ments, "including vested interests therein" may be sold on execution, 8
Moreover, the states which allow executions upon equitable interests in
land also hold, for the most part at least, that judgment liens attach to
such interests." 9 As a result of the growing tendency to enact legislation
-of this character, judgment creditors of purchasers under land contracts
and of other equitable owners of real estate are coming to have the same
remedies against their debtors as are available to judgment creditors of
,owners of legal interests in land or chattels.120
When the judgment creditors of the vendor under a land contract
seek to reach the land or the purchase money, the problems which arise
must also be solved in their legislative setting. In every American juris-
diction, statutes make judgments liens upon legal estates in land (pro-
vided that statutory formalities as to docketing, recording, and so forth
have been complied with)' 2' and provide that land may be sold upon
execution. Where the land sought to be reached is subject to a con-
114. See 2 FREasrar, ExxcuTioNs (3d ed. 1900) 997 et seq.
115. E.g., ARr. DIG. STAT. (Kirby & Castle, 1916) § 3542; ILL. REV. STAT. (Smith-
Hurd, 1933) c. 77, §§ 3, 10; Mo. STAT. AxN. § 1172.
116. E.g., Hardy v. Heard, 15 Ark. 184 (1854).
117. Reynolds v. Fleming, 43 Blinn. 513, 45 N. W. 1099 (1890), construing MlnIr..
STAT. (Mlason, 1927) §§ 9425, 10933-9. Cf. State ex rel. Oatey Orchard Co. v. Superior
Court, 154 Wash. 10, 280 Pac. 350 (1929) (attachment of purchaser's interest); (1930) 5
WAsH. L. REv. 79.
118. First Nat. Bank v. Logue, 89 Ohio St. 288, 106 N. E. 21 (1914), construing
Onlo GEN. CODE AanN. (Page, 1912) § 11655. Subsequent to this decision, the legisslature of
Ohio amended the portion of § 11655 quoted in the text to read "including vested legal
interests therein", 111 Ohio Laws 366 (1925); and in Culp v. Jacobs, 123 Ohio St. 109, 174
N. E. 242 (1930), it was held that, in consequence of this amendment, equitable interests in
land were no longer subject to levy and sale upon execution.
I19. See 2 FaxxsrAx, JunnaF.NTs (5th ed. 1925) § 937. As to judgment Hens on the in-
terest of a purchaser under a land contract, see also Rand & Co. v. Garner, 75 Iowa 311, 39
N. W. 515 (1888); Hook v. Northwest Thresher Co., 91 Blinn. 482, 98 N. W. 463 (1904).
120. In New York, by the express terms of N. Y. Civ. PRLAcncE Act, § 513, the interest
of the purchaser under a land contract is not subject to judgment lens and cannot ba
levied upon or sold on execution.
121. See 2 FixExrAw, JuDaNTs (5th ed. 1925) §§ 916, 918, 936.
122. See note 107, supra.
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tract of sale, however, these statutory rights of lien and of execution are
affected in equity if the conversion theory be applied.
Statutes giving judgment liens on land commonly apply in terms as
well where the judgment debtor has agreed to sell the land as where he
holds it unencumbered. But in equity the creditor, since he has not
given fresh value,"a holds subject to the purchaser's equitable interest.""'
Where the entire purchase price has been paid, this means that the ven-
dor's creditors get nothing in equity. Where the price or a part of it
remains unpaid, many courts hold that a judgment creditor of the vendor
who has complied with necessary statutory formalities gets a lien on the
land to the extent of the unpaid purchase money. 25 This lien may be
discharged by payment of the balance of the purchase money due al-
though less than the amount of the judgment. 20 Moreover, if the pur-
chaser pays the vendor in ignorance of the judgment, he is protected
although the judgment is a lien of record.127 But if the payment to the
vendor is made with actual notice of the judgment, it has been said that
the creditor's lien on the land is not affected. 128  This is consistent with
the result reached by some of the decisions in the analogous case of pay-
ments made by a purchaser to his vendor with knowledge of a subsequent
mortgage 129 or conveyance80 by the latter. In these cases, however, it
may be said that there is an implied assignment of the purchase money,
which can hardly be claimed in the case of a judgment. Moreover,
123. Cf. 2 Pomrmoy, op. cit. supra note 12, at § 749.
124. Lane v. Ludlow, 6 Paige 316, n. (a) (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1837); Hampson v. Edelcn,
2 Har. & John. 64, 66 (Md. 1807) ; Skinner & Sons' Co. v. Houghton, 92 Md. 68, 86 (1900);
Filley and Hopkins v. Duncan, 1 Neb. 134, 138 (1871).
125. E.g., Simpson v. Niles, 1 Ind. 196 (1848); Courtnay v. Parker, 16 Neb. 311, 20
N. W. 120 (1884); Coggshall v. Marine Bank Co., 63 Ohio St. 88, 57 N. E. 1086 (1900);
May v. Emerson, 52 Ore. 262, 267, 96 Pac. 454, 456 (1908); Reid v. Gorman, 37 S. D.
314, 321, 158 N. W. 780, 783 (1916).
126. Gaar v. Lockridge, 9 Ind. 92 (1857).
127. Burke v. Johnson, 37 Kan. 337, 344, 15 Pac. 204, 208 (1887); Filley and
Hopkins v. Duncan, 1 Neb. 134, 139 (1871) (good discussion). Cf. note 147, infra.
128. May v. Emerson, 52 Ore. 262, 267, 96 Pac. 454, 456 (1908); 2 FamxeAi,
JuDGmENTS (5th ed. 1925) 2031. In Lefferson v. Dallas, 20 Ohio St. 68 (1870), a purchaser
was held not protected as to payments made to his vendor pursuant to an oral contract
with notice that the action which later resulted in a judgment against the vendor was
pending. The court proceeded on the theory that the judgment lien was effective as of the
first day of the term of court at which the judgment was rendered, which, as it happened,
was an earlier date than that of the purchaser's payment. Even if the view be accepted
that the purchaser is not protected in payments made after he knows of a judgment against
his vendor, the theory of this decision seems difficult to justify.
129. E.g., Young v. Guy, 87 N. Y. 457, 462 (1882), aff'g 12 Hun 325, 328 (N. Y. Sup.
Ct. 1877), 23 Hun 1, 7 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1880); Jaeger v. Hardy, 48 Ohio St. 335, 339, 27
N. E. 863, 864 (1891); Franklin Finance Co. v. Bowden, 36 Ohio App, 19, 22, 172 N. E.
698, 699 (1930), noted in (1931) 9 Tax. L. Rav. 444.
130. E.g., Ten Eick v. Simpson, 1 Sandf. Ch. 244 (N. Y. 1844).
EQUITABLE CONVERSION
it is difficult to see why the purchaser's knowledge of a judgment
against, or even of a mortgage or conveyance by, his vendor, should im-
pose upon him the necessity of paying otherwise than in accordance with
his contract. 3 ' Some courts have held, and, it would seem, with sound
reason, that the vendor's judgment creditors acquire no lien as against
the purchaser even though the purchase price is unpaid and the pur-
chaser knows of the judgment' 32 This works no injustice upon the credi-
tors, who may proceed by garnishment to reach the purchase money or by
bill for equitable execution to reach both purchase money and vendor's
lien.133
Where land contracted to be sold is levied upon and sold on an execu-
tion against the vendor, the principle of purchase for value without notice
may become operative. A third person who buys at an execution sale
without notice, actual or constructive, of a prior contract for the sale
of the land bought by him acquires that land free of the purchaser's in-
terest.134 Such is the result even though the execution buyer gets notice
of the contract after the sale and payment of the price to the sheriff but
before obtaining a sheriff's deed. 35 This exception to the usual rule that
one must get in the legal title without notice in order to be protected as
a bona fide purchaser 30 is justified on the ground that otherwise "few
persons would accept the hazards of bidding at an execution sale."'3
Where the execution creditor himself buys at his own sale, the slight
weight of authority holds that, since he has not given fresh value, he
is not protected even though he has no notice of the prior contract." 3
The contrary view, which seems better calculated to promote the maxi-
131. Cf. Doolittle v. Cook, 75 Ill. 354, 358 (1874); Frank v. Stratford-Hancock, 13
Wyo. 37, 64, 77 Pac. 134, 141 (1904). But see Stone, The Equdable MghLts and Liabiles
of Strangers to a Contract (1919) 19 CoL. L. Rnv. 177, ISO, where it is argued that a pay-
ment by the purchaser to the vendor with notice of a sale or mortgage of the land, " ...
although a discharge of the legal obligation, is such a participation by the vendee in the
equitable wrong of the vendor as will make the vendee liable as upon a tort for interference
with the equitable rights of the vendor's grantee". This argument necessarily proceeds on
the theory that the grantee or mortgagee of the vendor will be treated as an a-mgne of
the vendor's claim to the unpaid purchase money, and seems inapplicable to the judgment
lien situation.
132. E.g., State Bank of Decatur v. Sanders, 114 Ark. 440, 170 S. W. 86 (1914); Wood-
ward v. Dean, 46 Iowa 499 (1877).
133. See Baldwin v. Thompson, 15 Iowa 504, 503 (1864); Taylor v. Lowenstein, 50
iss. 278, 282 (1874).
134. Lessee of Paine v. Moreland, 15 Ohio 435, 443 (1846).
135. Duff v. Randall, 116 Cal. 226, 231, 48 Pac. 66, 68 (1897); Maroney v. Boyle, 141
N. Y. 462, 470, 36 N. E. 511, 513 (1894) ; Oviatt v. Brown, 14 Ohio 285, 294 (1346).
136. See Hus'oN, ENroRCEa-ENT or DEcnEs 3N EQurry (1915) 122 et seq.
137. 3 FREEaw, E-mecuroNs (3d ed. 1900) 1972.
138. See 3 FREEr, ExMmcooNs (3d ed. 1900) 1947.
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mum realization on execution sales, has, however, considerable support
in the decisions.180
Where the buyer at the execution sale has notice of the contract (or,
on the majority view, where he is the judgment creditor buying at his
own sale), he takes subject to the purchaser's interest; hence, where
the entire purchase price has been paid, he acquires nothing in equity,
140
and, according to a few courts, nothing at law.141 Moreover, where the
purchaser has given notes for the price which have been negotiated by
the vendor prior to the execution sale, a buyer at that sale acquires no
right to the purchase money;"" and it would seem that the same result
should follow where there has been an assignment by the vendor of the
purchase money although not represented by notes. Where, however,
the purchase money or a part thereof is unpaid and the vendor has not
assigned his rights, a buyer of the land at execution sale who has taken
subject to the purchaser's interest is permitted by some courts to claim
from the purchaser the amount due under the contract.' 4 It is difficult to
support these decisions except upon the dubious theory that the sale
of the land is to be treated as a sale of the judgment creditor's lien on
the land (provided he has such a lien' 4'); and the better rule would seem
to be that the sale of land subject to a contract of sale on an execution
against the vendor gives the buyer with notice no claim to the purchase
money, 41 which must be reached by garnishment or by a bill for equitable
execution to reach both purchase money and security. Even in jurisdic-
139. E.g., Gower v. Doheney, 33 Iowa 36 (1871); Wood v. Chapin, 13 N. Y. 509, 519,
525 (1856).
140. Valentine v. Seiss, 79 Md. 187, 28 AUt. 892 (1894).
141. Fleming v. Wilson, 92 Minn. 303, 100 N. W. 4 (1904). See also Strauss v. White,
66 Ark. 167, 51 S. W. 64 (1899) (notes given for purchase price).
142. Leitch & Stubbs v. May, 98 Ga. 714, 27 S. E. 151 (1896); Jackson v. Snell,
34 Ind. 241 (1870); Blackmer v. Phillips, 67 N. C. 340 (1872); Catlin v. Bennatt, 47 Tex.
165 (1877). The rule as to the effect of a conveyance by a vendor who has theretofore
parted with purchase money notes is the same. State Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Faison, 114
Ga. 655, 40 S. E. 760 (1901); Note (1925) 35 A. L. R. 28 (collecting cases). So also of a
subsequent mortgage by the vendor. Doolittle v. Cook, 75 Ill. 354 (1874)1. And a holder in
due course of such notes has been held to prevail over a mortgagee of the grantee whose
mortage is prior to the transfer of the notes although subsequent to the contract of sale.
Gholston Bros. v. Northeastern Banking Co., 158 Ga. 291, 123 S, E. 111 (1924) (with
dissent).
143. But cf. Kinports v. Boynton, 120 Pa. 306, 319, 14 At1. 135, 137 (1888) (unrecorded
assignment as collateral security).
144. Hardee v. McMichael, 68 Ga. 678, 680 (1882); Fasholt v. Reed, 16 S. &
R. 266, 267 (Pa. 1827) ; Patterson's Estate, 25 Pa. 71 (1855). Cf. Latin-American Bank v.
Rogers, 87 Fla. 147, 151, 99 So. 546, 547 (1924).
145. Cf. notes 125, 132, supra.
146. Chisholm v. Andrews, 57 Miss. 636 (1880); Cooper v. Arnett, 95 Ky. 603, 26 S. W.




tions where the buyer at the execution sale can claim the purchase money,
the purchaser is protected if he pays the vendor in ignorance of the
sale.
1 47
In determining the rights of judgment creditors of the vendor under a
land contract and of buyers of the land at sales on execution against him,
recording acts may become important. For example, a statute may pro-
vide that recorded levies of execution on land shall create liens as "against
all prior grantees and mortgagees of whose claims the party interested
shall not have actual nor constructive notice."'s Under such a statute,
the question presents itself whether a purchaser under a prior unrecorded
contract who pays his vendor without actual notice of the recorded levy
is protected 49 Many other problems of this general character arise
under various types of recording legislation. Some of them have re-
cently been ably discussed elsewhere. 0  Enough has been said here to
indicate the essential importance of this and other legislation in deter-
mining the rights and remedies of the creditors of vendors and purchasers
under land contracts, and to demonstrate the extent to which statutes
have woven themselves into the very fabric of the law of equitable con-
version as applied in such cases.
[To be concluded]
147. Moyer v. HnInan, 13 N. Y. 180 (1855). Cf. note 127, supra; Young v. Guy, 87
N. Y. 457, 461 (1882).
148. MaCH. Comn'. LAws (1929) § 14618.
149. Corey v. Smalley, 106 Mich. 257, 64 N. W. 13 (1895) (holding the purchaser pro-
tected under these circumstances).
150. Durfee and Fleming, Res Judicata and Recording Acts: Does a Judgment Conc ude
Non-Parties of Whose Interests the Plaintiff has No Notice? (1930) 28 MAclc L. Ra,. 311
(also discussing the similar problems which arise in connection with unrecorded deed3 and
mortgages).
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